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Statistician, heal thyself: fighting
statophobia at the source
Aleksandar Aksentijevic*
Department of Psychology, University of Roehampton, London, UK
Notwithstanding the popularity of psychology courses throughout the world, educators
face a constant and difficult problem of overcoming the fear of and dislike for statistics
which represents one of the pillars of modern psychological science. Although the issue
is complex and multifaceted, here I argue that “statophobia” might represent a rational
and justified response to the sense of unease felt in contact with abstract statistical
concepts which are often vague, circular or ill-defined. I illustrate the problem by briefly
discussing twomyths about the nature of probability and statistics, namely that probability
and statistics generate knowledge and that the fault for not understanding probability
lies solely with the subjective cognition which is incapable of comprehending deeper
mathematical truth. I argue that the confident presentation of statistical methods hides
numerous conceptual blind spots that students might be aware of and that need to be
addressed before other causes of statistics anxiety can be tackled successfully.
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WHO’S AFRAID OF THE BIG BAD: : : CENTRAL LIMIT THEOREM?
Many candid persons, when confrontedwith the results of Probability, feel a strong sense of the
uncertainty of the logical basis upon which it seems to rest. It is difficult to find an intelligible
account of the meaning of “probability,” or of how we are ever to determine the probability of
any particular proposition; and yet treatises on the subject profess to arrive at complicated resu-
lts of the greatest precision and the most profound practical importance (Keynes, 1921, p. 56).
Teaching statistics represents every psychology lecturer’s baptism of fire. Facing a large
auditorium packed with eager faces that start to sink into boredom and incomprehension as soon as
the word “variance” is mentioned and its formula appears on the screen has filled many a new (as
well as experienced) lecturer with a sense of foreboding and self-doubt. According to some estimates
(e.g., Onwuegbuzie and Wilson, 2003), between 66 and 80% of students experience some degree of
statistics anxiety.
Mathematics and statistics anxiety are related (Baloğlu, 1999) since statistics is formulated in the
language of mathematics. Many of the causes of mathematics anxiety are transferrable to statistics,
including difficulty of manipulating formulae as well as problems with performing arithmetical and
algebraic operations. At the same time, research suggests that mathematics and statistics anxiety are
distinct—if closely related—phenomena (Baloğlu, 2004). Some authors have observed utilization of
different cognitive mechanisms (Cruise et al., 1985) and that statistical reasoning might be closer to
verbal than mathematical reasoning (Buck, 1987). Like mathematics anxiety, statistics anxiety has
been studied primarily using quantitative measures (e.g., STARS; Cruise et al., 1985). A number
of dispositional and situational factors have been linked with statistics anxiety including gender,
culture, tendency to procrastinate and reading ability (see Chew and Dillon, 2014a, for review).
Although some experts acknowledge the beneficial effects of medium anxiety levels (Keeley
et al., 2008), statistics anxiety has been causally linked with reduced performance in a number
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of disciplines—from psychology (Lalonde and Gardner, 1993;
Macher et al., 2011) and education (Onwuegbuzie et al., 2000) to
business (Zanakis and Valenzi, 1997). Consequently, a number of
“treatments” has been proposed including reducing mathematical
content and the amount of hand calculation, keeping students
engaged, using humor, increasing instructor confidence and
immediacy (Chew and Dillon, 2014a) and teaching online
(DeVaney, 2010).
What could be causing statistics anxiety? Since a number of
researchers cite negative attitudes toward statistics as the cause
(e.g., Watson et al., 2002; Chiesi and Primi, 2010), the question
should be rephrased—what causes the negativity (in addition to
the factorsmentioned above)? Statistics can be distinguished from
mathematics in one important way—it aims to “freeze,” quantify
and package uncertainty—that fundamental imponderable of
human existence. A recent systematic review of statistics anxiety
literature (Chew and Dillon, 2014a) mentions only one study in
which uncertainty features as a possible causal factor (Williams,
2013), and even there only as a psychological predisposition rather
than an inherent property of statistics.
Although statistics teaching has come under increased scrutiny
by the researchers, judging by the number of papers devoted to the
topic in recent years, there is a creeping doubt that the problem
lies not in the inability of students to “think properly” but in deep
unresolved issues that underpin the foundations of probability
and statistics. This is supported by the fact that expert researchers
ostensibly exhibit an alarming lack of statistical aptitude—to the
extent that the validity of most research findings in most research
fields has been questioned (e.g., Ioannidis, 2005). Recurring
episodes of heightened concern over statistical reasoning and
performance of both students (current research topic) and experts
(e.g., Cumming, 2014) suggest that the causes of anxiety and
apprehension are at least partly to be found in the logic of
statistical reasoning itself. Here, I briefly address twomyths whose
deconstruction might contribute to ameliorating the problem.
MYTH 1: STATISTICS GENERATES
KNOWLEDGE
The development of powerful mathematical models and
sophisticated inferential systems has engendered the belief
that uncertainty is somehow controllable and—the worst of
sins—conquerable. The ability to produce complex formulae
which partition probabilities of various outcomes, weigh
unequal conditional likelihoods and take into account prior
knowledge does require mathematical sophistication that escapes
many researchers, let alone students. At the same time, it
fosters the mistaken impression that the formulae themselves
generate qualitatively new information that is not present in the
phenomena under observation.
If a pattern or a difference between objects is salient, our senses
are sufficiently acute to detect and discriminate inmost situations.
Statistics becomes necessary when differences and dependencies
become too small, numerous, complex, or remote to be analyzed
by means of perception. This increase in informational distance
between the observer and the phenomenon is managed via two
basic steps. One is to exchange individual values/scores for a
single number that hopefully retains maximum information. The
second step is to quantify the uncertainty of this estimate. The
amount of information conveyed by the mean is given by the
variance. The more similar the scores, the lower the variance and
the more informative the mean is. Here we face a paradox: The
more informative the mean is, the less information there is in the
population. To illustrate, in a population consisting of 4s, themean
of four conveys maximum information about the population.
Yet, the population containing only 4s is maximally redundant
and bereft of information (e.g., Shannon, 1948; Aksentijevic and
Gibson, 2012). Thus, statistics provide most information about
populations that possess no information at all. The more complex
a data set, the less we can know about it. Rather than generating
knowledge, statistics is at its best when no information is present.
The link between probabilistic models and real-life phenomena
is tenuous at best. The use of probabilistic models in statistics
is underpinned by a number of assumptions that can often
not be confirmed empirically. Although this is dealt with by
means of various methodological legerdemains, one example
is sufficient to expose the students’ predicament. In order for
results of statistical tests to be interpreted in terms of a particular
statistical model (e.g., Gaussian), wemust assume that the process
in question is unchanging over time (i.e., ergodic; see Attneave,
1959). Given the dynamic, ever-changing nature of reality on
all scales, it is difficult to understand how the assumption of
ergodicity can be maintained. If students cannot articulate these
concerns, there is no reason to believe that they are not aware
of them. Perhaps, anxiety stems from inchoate understanding of
the impossibility of reconciling the fundamental unknowability of
most future outcomes and the apparent certainty with which laws
of probability and statistical procedures are expounded by experts.
The apparatus of statistical reasoning has its origins in
the inability of scientists to describe and predict outcomes
of complex processes—either on macro (gambling; Hacking,
1975) or micro scales (molecular motion; Uffink, 2006). Rather
than a major advance in the search for truth, statistics could
justifiably be viewed as an admission of defeat in the face of
phenomena that defy easy description. Probabilistic reasoning
can be reduced to the following statement: In the absence of
information about the process under observation, all outcomes
are equally likely—anything can happen. This statement is easily
converted into a mathematical expression and elaborated in
a number of ways to account for different combinations of
outcomes. Equally, a posteriori probabilities can be modified
by additional information (Bayesian calculus). However, none
of these operations produces new information in the sense of
affecting the reality on the ground. Probabilistic reasoning is a
posteriori by definition. The best it can do is to roughly describe
certain processes that are inaccessible to unaided perception.
MYTH 2: IT IS ALL OUR FAULT
An important contributory cause of statistics anxiety could be
the constantly reinforced mantra, according to which human
observers are failures at statistical reasoning (e.g., Kahneman and
Tversky, 1972). This is in addition to apparent inability to reason
logically (Wason, 1966) and well-documented biases observed in
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simplest perceptual tasks such as bisecting a line (e.g., Jewell and
McCourt, 2000). According to the dominant paradigm, human
mind, that supposedly unique natural system replete with ability
and potential is at the same time highly fallible and incapable of
understanding even the basic tenets of logic and probability. If
we combine this with the reluctance to question and challenge
the teacher (Cruise et al., 1985), is it surprising that students
feel anxious and uncomfortable from the start? Statistics anxiety
could bemore pernicious thanmathematics anxiety. Mathematics
is an enclosed system which exists independently of observation
(although its subjective origins should be acknowledged). By
contrast, probability makes inferences about real-life phenomena
which all of us deal with regularly and understand intuitively.
When told that our intuitions about our own experience are
wrong, we are more likely to doubt our overall competence.
One of the most difficult problems encountered by lecturers
is explaining the concept of randomness. As confirmed by the
massive literature devoted to the subject, students are not the only
ones that have difficulties with it. When “randomly” assigning
subjects to conditions or generating “random” patterns, they
might find that the supposedly random process often generates
patterns that appear regular and repetitive (Lopes, 1982). Soon,
they might experience a cognitive dissonance between the given
definitions of randomness and their own intuitions. For instance,
a random process involves infinity and complete independence
between outcomes (e.g., Falk, 1991). How are we supposed to
interact with a process that produces completely unknowable
outcomes? When asked to generate “random-like” sequences,
students soon learn that their performance systematically departs
from the “laws” of probability. Specifically, they are told that they
produce toomany alternations and too few streaks (Gilovich et al.,
1985; Oskarsson et al., 2009). And yet, if the “correct” distribution
is known in advance, the process cannot be random. Students’
anxietymight subside somewhat if they knew thatmathematicians
working for the RAND corporation were caught correcting tables
of random numbers that were not sufficiently irregular (Gell-
Mann, 1994).
The main source of confusion is the circular nature of
“objective” probabilistic reasoning. Probabilistic models and ideas
of randomness have subjective origins. Randomness represents
abstract idealization of subjective complexity. Over time, it
became so abstract as to lose any connection with its experiential
sources. Randomization was invented in order to remove biases
and preclude easy prediction. Randomization algorithms and
other complex processes push the boundaries of complexity
outside of the grasp of unaided perception and cognition. Is it
then surprising that humans fail to understand randomness?Why
would we expect humans whose cognition is pattern-based to be
able to comprehend or generate sequences that lack any patterning
or that conform to some probabilistic model? A random process
can generate any outcome, leaving observers completely helpless.
If they label a disordered sequence “random,” they are told that
this is no more random than a sequence of zeros, forcing them to
suppress their (correct) intuition which says that ordered patterns
are more likely to be generated by a deterministic process and
that random patterns are generated by complex processes which
they cannot understand. Equally, if they characterize an ordered
pattern as non-random, they are informed that they are wrong
and that runs of identical symbols are often produced by random
processes1.
Related to this, one of the most consistent (and anxiety-
inducing) findings in psychology has been the observation that
subjects perform poorly on tasks requiring partitioning and
weighting probabilities in the presence of partial information
(Keren, 1984; Mandel, 2008). A good example is the three-card
problemwhich produces significant departures from probabilistic
norm (Falk and Lann, 2008). There are thee cards—red/red,
red/green and green/green. If a card is drawn that shows a
red face, what is the probability that its other face is red? A
majority of subjects (at least 65%) failed to give a correct answer
(2/3), preferring the uniform partitioning of probabilities (1/2)2.
Following similar results obtained in related experiments, the
authors concluded that “The size of the deviations from truth
caused by falsely applying uniformity might not be practically
pernicious, nonetheless, such judgments are wrong in principle.
(p. 331; italics mine)” This sounds like an admonishment of
the imperfect mind for its inability to keep up with the eternal
mathematical truth. Yet, probabilistic calculus emerged from
subjective observation and deduction. Following mathematical
elaboration and abstraction, it became too detached from
experience to remain relevant to reasoning about every-day
events—for which purpose it had been invented in the first place.
How can intuition, which created probability, be wrong when
studied by its offspring? What matters is that having seen one red
face, all we know (and can reasonably know) is that the second face
could be either red or green. Knowing the correct probability tells
us something about our long-term prospects of finding another
red face assuming that the uniformity decried by the authors is
imposed on the sample space, but nothing about what we are likely
to find once we turn the card3.
HONESTY IS THE BEST POLICY?
Statistics anxiety is a ubiquitous feature of social science courses.
Part of the blame lies with the lack of practice, reputation of
statistics as a “difficult” subject and mathematics-related issues.
At the same time, learning to think statistically creates a conflict
between intuition and the objective framework that constantly
falsifies and challenges our understanding of how theworldworks.
Although this is not necessarily wrong in itself, a closer inspection
of probabilistic thinking shows that the counterintuitive nature of
1The fundamental disconnect between requirements of real-life research and
randomness has caused a gradual weakening of the strict definition of the
latter. Thus, Shannon (1948) speaks of a “known” random source and some
authors have attempted to analyze the structure of random processes (e.g.,
Sun and Wang, 2010). Such attempts at “taming” randomness simply confirm
the fundamental incompatibility between abstract probabilistic concepts and
human perception and cognition (Aksentijevic, 2015).
2The sample consisted of over a 1000 students from an elite university.
3One of the greatest mathematicians of the twentieth century, Paul Erdös
refused to accept the correct solution to the related “Monty Hall” problem
(Vazsonyi, 1999). The solution depends on all prescribed possibilities being
available equally often. This presumes uniformity—which is viewed as a fallacy
when applied to individual outcomes. Also, see Keynes (1921, Chapter 5) on
the impossibility of adjudging the truth of these alternative interpretations.
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statistics does not originate in some deeper truth inaccessible to a
lay observer, but is an unavoidable consequence of the dissonance
between the fundamental limitations of human cognition and
attempts to overcome these by means of mathematical formalism.
After years of training, some students conquer their anxiety and
become proficient. As recommended in the literature, when facing
the next generation of students, the newly fledged expert has to
present a confident front and readily offer answers to difficult
questions. But how can they maintain their confidence in the
light of the finding that a large majority of expert researchers
are well-nigh incompetent? In addition to focusing on putative
antecedents of statistics anxiety, experts need to start a dialog that
will shift the focus from the viability of various testing methods
(e.g., the null-hypothesis significance testing,NHST) to discussing
the appropriate role of statistics in research and more generally,
science.
The first step could be to acknowledge the fundamental
limitations of human mind and place statistics in this context.
Rather than a panacea capable of advancing knowledge,
probability and statistics should be viewed as an attempt to
extend our informational reach into domains that are inherently
beyond our grasp. We cannot know how successful our efforts are
because the available tools are too simple to provide a complete (or
even a partial) description of a phenomenon under observation.
While being honest about limitations of statistics might not
endear the lecturer to students who often crave certainty, honesty
might pay off in the long run in terms of managing anxiety
and unrealistic expectations as well as reducing the appeal of
questionable practices. For if the relationship between statistics
and reality is understood, more attention might be devoted to the
psychological importance of experiments and less to the statistical
significance of the result. At the same time, such a conceptual shift
must be preceded by a substantial expert debate leading to a new
consensus.
CONCLUSION
The ubiquitous problem of statistics anxiety has been investigated
from many angles including gender (Rodarte-Luna and Sherry,
2008), motivation (Lavasani et al., 2014), and personality (Chew
and Dillon, 2014b). However, none of the studies has considered
that discomfort could partly originate in the disconnect between
the certainty with which statistics is taught and the fundamental
uncertainty inherent in it. This is of particular importance for
psychologists who are expected to show a deeper understanding
of the relationship between the mind and the statistical apparatus
used to investigate it. In conclusion, I would like to offer the
following summary which might reassure students next time
they think they are incompetent because they do not understand
probability and statistics:
a. Probability is an attempt to control uncertainty. It has
no “laws”; it does not generate new information and has
no predictive power. Ability to manipulate probabilities
mathematically has no impact on individual outcomes of real-
life processes. Predictability depends on the complexity of the
phenomenon under observation and available resources. The
more we know about the process, the more we know about its
outcomes.
b. Statistics can help with extracting information from noise,
but the trade-off is the increase in uncertainty with respect
to interpretation. Rather than allowing us to “gain one up on
the Universe,” statistics is subject to the same fundamental
cognitive limitations that necessitated its birth.
c. Probability models serve as ad hoc aids in framing research
and providing reassurance and not as guarantors of truth.
Outcomes of experiments might or might not come from a
particular stochastic process but this can never be confirmed
(or falsified). If someone objects that this does not affect the
validity of statistical inference, the confused student would
be justified in wondering why statistical models are used at
all. The final arbiters of veridicality of a result are effect size
(Cohen, 1969) and reproducibility4. These factors however
say nothing about its importance.
d. Randomness is a mathematical idealization of subjective
complexity. Students should be made aware that there is no
such thing as a “random” process and that they are not in
error when failing to reason or behave in accordance with
probabilistic models. The problem lies elsewhere.
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